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I. INTRODUCTION 
The troubling prospect of convicting an innocent person is no longer a mere 
specter that haunts our criminal justice system—it is a reality. Ronald Cotton.1 
Wilton Dedge.2 Nicholas Yarris.3 These names represent only a few of the people 
who have lost years of their lives serving time for crimes they did not commit.4 
California inmate Kevin Cooper has spent almost half of his life on California’s 
death row,5 despite overwhelming evidence calling his guilt into question.6 Five 
federal judges openly believe Cooper did not receive a fair hearing and is 
“probably innocent” of the crimes of which he was convicted in 1985.7 Yet, as of 
March 2014, Cooper remains on death row, awaiting execution.8 
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, 2014; B.A., Legal Studies, 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2003. I am very grateful to Professor Emily Garcia Uhrig for her invaluable 
guidance and inspiration, and to John S., Beth Jaworski, and John H. for their expertise and helpful comments.  
I would also like to thank the editors of the McGeorge Law Review, as well as my friends and family for their 
constant support. 
1. Ronald Cotton served 10.5 years of a life sentence for a crime he did not commit. Cotton is now an 
advocate for criminal justice reform and works closely with the victim who misidentified him, Jennifer 
Thompson, to educate the public about the dangers of eyewitness misidentification. Ronal Cotton, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Ronald_Cotton.php (last visited Nov. 10, 2012) (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). 
2. Wilton Dedge served twenty-two years of a life sentence for a crime he did not commit. Although 
DNA evidence proved Dedge’s innocence in 2001, he was not released until 2004 because the State of Florida 
continued to object to his release on procedural grounds, admitting at one point that they “would oppose 
Dedge’s release even if they knew that he was absolutely innocent.” Wilton Dedge, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Wilton_Dedge.php (last visited Nov. 10, 2012) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
3. Nicholas Yarris served 21.5 years of a death sentence for a crime that he did not commit. Nicholas 
Yarris, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Nicholas_Yarris.php (last visited Nov. 
10, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). “Nick Yarris at first faced the electric chair and later lethal 
injection” before DNA exonerated him in 2004. Nick Builds New Life After 23 Years on Death Row, SPALDING 
GUARDIAN, http://www.spaldingtoday.co.uk/news/latest-news/nick-builds-new-life-after-23-years-on-death-
row-1-4957342 (last visited April 3, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).  During his time in prison, 
Yarris spent 8,057 days in solitary confinement. Id. 
4. Know the Cases, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited Nov. 10, 
2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
5. Cooper v. Brown, 565 F.3d 581, 634 (9th Cir. 2009) (J. Fletcher, dissenting); Kevin Cooper Fact Sheet, 
http://www.savekevincooper.org/Scripts/DataLibraries/upload/kevincooper_fact_sheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 
2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
6. Cooper v. Brown, 565 F.3d 581, 581 (9th Cir. 2009) (J. Fletcher, dissenting). 
7. Id. Judge Fletcher, joined by four other Ninth Circuit judges, wrote over one hundred pages in dissent, 
calling Kevin Cooper’s guilt into question and stating that Kevin Cooper is “probably innocent.” Id. at 634–35. 
8. Kevin Cooper Fact Sheet, supra note 5. 
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At the time of this Comment, over three hundred people have been 
exonerated nationwide through post-conviction DNA testing and had their 
wrongful convictions overturned.9 However, the number of innocent people in 
prison is likely much higher.10 As DNA evidence is not available in the majority 
of criminal cases,11 we cannot rely on DNA alone to save every innocent 
prisoner; we must have a workable method for wrongfully convicted prisoners to 
prove their innocence even in the absence of DNA evidence. 
The alarming number of wrongful convictions serves as a resounding alert 
that “an unconstitutional breakdown in the [criminal justice] process has 
occurred.”12 This issue is particularly troubling in California, a state that criminal 
justice experts believe “has put more innocent people behind bars than any other 
state.”13 Yet, current California law provides little opportunity for wrongfully 
convicted prisoners to secure their release.14 Something must be done. 
The writ of habeas corpus is a civil proceeding allowing a prisoner to attack 
collaterally his criminal conviction by “claiming that constitutional violations 
during his trial now make his confinement unconstitutional.”15 Habeas corpus 
was intended to function as a safeguard against the injustice of depriving an 
innocent person of his life or liberty;16 “a prisoner’s last chance to have his 
 
9. Know the Cases, supra note 4. 
10. “[O]nly an estimated ten to twenty percent of criminal cases in the United States have any biological 
evidence for DNA testing. This statistic suggests that documented DNA exonerations likely represent only a 
mere fraction of the total number of innocent prisoners who are currently incarcerated.” Daniel S. Medwed, 
California Dreaming: The Golden State’s Restless Approach to Newly Discovered Evidence of Innocence, 40 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1437, 1440 (2007); see also Carol Tavris & Elliot Aronson, MISTAKES WERE MADE (BUT 
NOT BY ME) 130 (2007). 
After a comprehensive study of criminal cases in which the convicted person was indisputably 
exonerated, law professor Samuel R. Gross and his associates concluded that “if we reviewed prison sentences 
with the same level of care that we devote to death sentences, there would have been over 28,500 non-death-
row exonerations in the past 15 years rather than the 255 that have in fact occurred.” Id. (emphasis in original). 
11. Medwed, supra note 10 and accompanying text. “Although post-conviction innocence claims hinging 
on DNA testing have captured the attention of state legislators and the broader public, the far more pervasive 
issue of innocence claims in cases that lack biological evidence has largely escaped notice.” Daniel S. Medwed, 
Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State 
Courts, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 655, 657 (2005) [hereinafter Up the River]. 
12. Randy Hertz & James Liebman, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 97 (6th ed. 
2011) (“The courts properly ought to take the fact that an innocent person may have been convicted . . . as one, 
among other, indicators that an unconstitutional breakdown in the process has occurred.”). 
13. Medwed, supra note 10, at 1442–43. “In the past 15 years, with surprisingly little fanfare, at least 200 
Californians have been freed after courts found they were unjustly convicted—nearly twice the number of 
known exonerations as in Illinois and Texas combined.” Id. at 1442 n.20 (citing Nina Martin, Innocence Lost, 
S.F MAG. Nov. 2004, at 78, 84). 
14. See infra Part V. 
15. Erik Degrate, I’m Innocent: Can a California Innocence Project Help Exonerate Me? . . . Not if the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) Has Its Way, 34 W. ST. U. L. REV. 67, 76 (2006). 
16. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 780 (2011) (“The writ of habeas corpus stands as a safeguard 
against imprisonment of those held in violation of the law.”). 
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sentence overturned, or better still, to prove his innocence.”17 Habeas corpus 
provides a crucial remedy for wrongfully convicted prisoners in California. 
In evaluating how habeas corpus law should be interpreted, courts must 
balance a number of competing interests.18 Concerns over abuse of the writ weigh 
in favor of limiting its reach.19 If the requirements for filing a writ are not 
sufficiently strict, prisoners could clog the criminal justice system by filing 
unwarranted or frivolous claims, which would overwhelm scarce judicial 
resources.20 Habeas review also raises concern over state sovereignty because 
allowing federal courts to review state court judgments can strain the relationship 
between state and federal courts.21 However, these concerns must ultimately be 
balanced against the grave injustice of holding a prisoner in violation of the 
Constitution.22 
While habeas corpus represents a wrongfully incarcerated person’s last 
chance for justice, the ability of the writ to deliver justice has been stifled by 
complex legal and procedural requirements at both the state23 and federal level.24 
In California, stringent substantive legal tests make habeas relief particularly 
difficult to obtain.25 Meanwhile, evidence of wrongful convictions and 
documentation of the difficulties innocent prisoners face in achieving 
exoneration are constantly increasing; to address the plight of wrongfully 
convicted prisoners, California should respond by making changes to its state 
habeas procedures. 
This Comment argues that in light of the procedural barriers to federal 
habeas corpus relief for state prisoners, California should adjust its own habeas 
law to provide more meaningful opportunities for relief at the state level. Part II 
provides a brief overview of the relationship between federal and state habeas 
law. Part III explains the legal standards and procedures for obtaining habeas 
corpus relief under California law. Part IV analyzes the problems with the current 
state of federal habeas law, while Part V analyzes the problems specific to 
California habeas law. Part VI suggests two reforms for habeas law in California: 
lowering the legal standard for relief and reforming the use of summary denials. 
 
17. Degrate, supra note 15, at 76. 
18. Matthew Mattingly, Actually Less Guilty: The Extension of the Actual Innocence Exception to the 
Sentencing Phase of Non-Capital Cases, 93 KY. L. J. 531, 533, 543 (2004). 
19. Id. 
20. Id.  
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 544 (citing Brown v. Allan, 344 U.S. 443, 554 (1954) (Black, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is never too 
late for courts in habeas corpus proceedings to look through procedural screens in order to prevent forfeiture of 
life or liberty in flagrant defiance of the Constitution.”). 
23. Medwed, supra note 10, at 1445 (describing the “high procedural, evidentiary, and legal bars” faced 
by California state prisoners seeking state habeas corpus relief). 
24. Id. at 1444 (“Federal habeas corpus has effectively vanished as a viable post-conviction remedy for 
potentially innocent state prisoners over the past decade.”). 
25. See infra Part V. 
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II. PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Although the remedy of habeas corpus exists at both the state and federal 
level,26 prisoners seeking habeas relief must first seek relief in state court.27 The 
prisoner may proceed to federal court to seek federal habeas relief only if the 
state habeas petition was denied and all of the prisoner’s state court remedies 
have been exhausted.28 Significantly, under of the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, a prisoner must file his federal habeas 
petition within one year of the date his state court conviction became final.29 This 
procedure is particularly burdensome because the majority of habeas petitioners 
are pro se litigants30 and AEDPA’s procedural requirements are extremely 
complex.31 These concerns are further exacerbated by the high rates of illiteracy 
and mental illness within the general prison population.32 As a result, many 
prisoners seeking federal habeas relief are barred by the federal statute of 
limitations and relief is denied on procedural grounds, rather than on the merits 
of the petition.33 
Because federal relief is difficult to obtain, it is particularly important that 
habeas petitioners have a full and fair opportunity to obtain relief in state court. 
This is especially important in California, a state that has had more wrongful 
convictions overturned than any other state except New York34 and where over 
ten-percent of the entire nation’s prison population is incarcerated.35 However, 
 
26. Mattingly, supra note 18, at 544. 
27. Hertz & Liebman, supra note 12, at 1183 (“The doctrine of ‘exhaustion of state remedies’ requires 
that federal habeas corpus petitioners adequately present their claims to the state court before seeking relief in 
from the federal courts.”); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(1)(B)(1)(a) (2006). 
28. Hertz & Liebman, supra note 12, at 1184. Under the “total exhaustion rule” federal courts are 
required to dismiss all unexhausted claims. In addition, they must also dismiss any petitions that contain both 
exhausted and unexhausted claims (i.e., “mixed petitions”). Id.  
29. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2006). The one-year clock is tolled, however, while the petitioner’s state post-
conviction application is pending. Id. § 2244(d)(2) (“The time during which a properly filed application for 
State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall 
not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.”). 
30. Emily Garcia Uhrig, The Sacrifice of Unarmed Prisoners to Gladiators: The Post-AEDPA Access-to-
the-Courts Demand for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Habeas Corpus, 14 U. PA. CONST. L. 
1219, 1223 (2012). 
31. Id. at 1252. 
32. Id. 
33. Hertz & Liebman, supra note 11, at 126 (“Recent studies provide some evidence that AEDPA has 
significantly reduced the availability of federal habeas corpus relief in state-prisoner and federal-prisoner 
cases.”); Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CAL L. REV. 1, 11 (2010) (“[F]ederal 
judges ultimately deny almost all petitions for relief without considering their substantive merits.”); Frank 
Tankard, Tough Ain’t Enough: Why District Courts Ignore Tough-on-Paper Standards for a Federal Prisoner’s 
Right to a Hearing and How Specialty Courts Would Fix the Problem, 79 UMKC L. REV. 775, 781–82 (2011) 
(“Forty-two percent of habeas petitions are dismissed without reaching the merits of any claim.”). 
34. UPDATE: 2012, THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 14 (April 3, 2013). 
35. Matthew Seligman, Harrington’s Wake: Unanswered Questions on AEDPA’s Application to 
Summary Dispositions, 64 STAN. L. REV. 469, 501 n.145 (2012). Based on the greater number of prisoners 
05_SCHRIEVER_V1_1-16-14-1_FINAL_05.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2014 11:05 AM 
2014 / Why California Should Care About Habeas Corpus 
768 
under current California law, habeas relief is almost impossible to obtain.36 In 
short, this means that many potentially innocent criminal defendants will remain 
in prison and will not be granted relief in any form. 
III. CALIFORNIA STATE HABEAS CORPUS 
This Part provides an overview of the use and function of the writ of habeas 
corpus in California. It explains the legal standards, procedural requirements, and 
relevant procedural exceptions as they relate to claims of actual innocence made 
in California state court. 
A. Generally 
Although the United States Constitution does not obligate states to provide 
for the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy,37 habeas corpus is guaranteed by the 
California constitution.38 In California, anyone who is “unlawfully imprisoned or 
deprived of his liberty” may pursue relief through the writ of habeas corpus.39 It 
is provided for by statute40 and is the primary post-conviction remedy used in 
California.41 As is the case under federal law, habeas corpus is intended to be an 
extraordinary remedy.42 It is not meant to serve as a second appeal and should 
generally be used only when all other state remedies have been exhausted.43 
  
 
incarcerated in California, it is not surprising that California has had more wrongful convictions than other 
states. This statistic suggests not that California proportionally makes more errors than other states, but simply 
that there may be more innocent prisoners in California (compared to other states) who are in need of 
meaningful opportunities for relief. 
36. See infra Part V. 
37. In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 763 (1993). 
38. CAL. CONST. art. I., § 11. 
39. CAL. PENAL CODE §1473(a) (West 2006). 
40. Id. §1473. 
41. Medwed, supra, note 10, at 1441. 
42. In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 764 (“Our cases simultaneously recognize, however, the extraordinary 
nature of habeas corpus relief from a judgment which, for this purpose, is presumed valid.”); In re Robbins, 18 
Cal. 4th 770, 777 (1998) (“[O]ur cases emphasize that habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy that ‘was not 
cretated for the purpose of defeating or embarrassing justice, but to promote it.’”); see also In re Clark, 5 Cal. 
4th at 803 (J. Kennard dissenting) (describing the traditional function of habeas corpus as a “flexible procedural 
remedy of last resort to prevent severe and manifest injustice”). 
43. Marks v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 4th 176, 188 (2002) (“[C]ollateral review by habeas corpus is not a 
reiteration or substitute for an appeal.”); see also Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (“Section 
2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a ‘guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal 
justice systems,’ not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.”). 
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B. Legal Standard for Relief in California 
In California, a petitioner may pursue the writ of habeas corpus to 
collaterally attack the validity of a judgment through challenges based on newly 
discovered evidence, jurisdictional defects, or constitutional claims.44 In order to 
limit the scope of this Article, this Comment focuses on claims based on newly 
discovered evidence. Newly discovered evidence is “one of the ‘more common 
issues’ raised in California state habeas petitions.”45 A court may grant habeas 
relief to a petitioner who proves actual innocence through newly discovered 
evidence.46 
Newly discovered evidence, however, may be a basis for habeas corpus relief 
only if the evidence “undermine[s] the entire structure of the case upon which the 
prosecution is based.”47 The evidence must be conclusive and “point unerringly to 
innocence or reduced culpability.”48 “It is not sufficient that the evidence might 
have weakened the prosecution case or presented a more difficult question for the 
judge or jury.”49 Rather, the new evidence must “cast[] fundamental doubt on the 
accuracy and reliability of the proceeding.”50 There must be more than evidence 
that might have raised a reasonable doubt as to guilt.51 “If ‘a reasonable jury 
could have rejected’” the newly discovered evidence, then the evidence will not 
be sufficient to warrant habeas relief.52 
In order to qualify as “new” evidence for newly discovered evidence 
purposes, it must be “evidence that [the petitioner] could not have discovered 
with reasonable diligence prior to judgment.”53 Notably, California courts have 
been known to construe the definition of “new” rather liberally in this context.54 
 
44.  In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 766–67. However, not all errors of constitutional dimension warrant habeas 
relief. Errors that carry no risk of convicting an innocent person do not provide grounds for habeas relief. For 
example, Fourth Amendment violations cannot provide the basis for a proper habeas claim. Id.  
45. Medwed, supra note 10, at 1454 n.82. 
46. In re Lawley, 42 Cal. 4th 1231, 1238 (2008); In re Hardy, 41 Cal. 4th 977, 1016 (2007); CAL. PENAL 
CODE §1473.6 (West 2006). 
47. In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 766; In re Lawley, 42 Cal. 4th at 1239; In re Hardy, 41 Cal. 4th at 1016. 
48. In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 766; In re Hardy, 41 Cal. 4th at 1016. For example, a credible third party 
confession could meet this standard. Id. 
49. In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 766. 
50. Id.; In re Lawley, 42 Cal. 4th at 1239. 
51. In re Hardy, 41 Cal. at 1017–18 (“The most that can be said is that this evidence would have 
presented a more difficult question for the jury and may well have created in the minds of the jurors a 
reasonable doubt as to petitioner’s guilt. As explained ante, this is not the standard.”). 
52. In re Lawley, 42 Cal. 4th at 1239. 
53. CAL. PENAL CODE §1473.6 (West 2006); In re Hardy, 41 Cal. 4th at 1016. 
54. Medwed, supra note 10, at 1455 n.86 (citing Cal.Jur. 3d Habeas Corpus § 50 (2006)) (“‘[N]ew 
evidence’ includes any evidence not presented to the trial court that is not merely cumulative in relation to 
evidence that was presented at trial.”).  
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C. Operation of the Writ in California Courts 
In California, a petitioner who is in custody may file a petition for habeas 
relief in the superior court, appellate court, or California Supreme Court;55 
although, in most instances, a petitioner is required to begin this process in 
superior court.56 If the writ is denied, the petitioner may not appeal the order of 
denial directly.57 Instead, the petitioner must file a new petition in a higher court.58 
Thus, if a petitioner files a state habeas petition in superior court and that petition 
is denied, the petitioner may file a new petition in the appellate court.59 The 
appellate court is not bound by the determinations of the lower court,60 unless the 
lower court made factual determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses. If 
witness testimony was presented to the lower court, the reviewing court must 
give “great weight” to those findings.61 However, documentary evidence is not 
entitled to this same deference and the appellate court may review such evidence 
freely.62 
When reviewing a petition for habeas relief, a court will evaluate the petition 
and make an initial determination as to whether the petitioner has stated a prima 
facie case for relief.63 The petitioner bears the initial burden of alleging all of the 
facts that would entitle him to habeas relief.64 This is a heavy burden because the 
court will interpret all presumptions in favor of the judgment.65 Furthermore, all 
claims known to the petitioner at the time the petition is filed must be included in 
the initial petition.66 
 
55. Medwed, supra note 10, at 1456 (citing CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10). 
56. People v. Steele, 32 Cal. 4th 682, 692 (2004) (“[B]oth trial and appellate courts have jurisdiction over 
habeas corpus petitions, but a reviewing court has discretion to deny without prejudice a habeas corpus petition 
that was not filed first in the proper lower court.”); In re Hillery, 202 Cal. App. 2d 293, 294 (1962) (“Generally 
speaking, habeas corpus proceedings involving a factual situation should be tried in superior court rather than in 
an appellate court, except where only questions of law are involved.”). 
57. Medwed, supra note 10, at 1458 (“The penal code does not provide for direct appellate review of a 
superior court decision rejecting a habeas corpus petition.”). 
58. Id. (“[W]hile technically prevented from appealing a superior court’s denial of a habeas corpus 
petition, litigants may simply file a new petition in the court of appeal.”). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 1459 (“[T]he appellate court need not afford tremendous deference to the ruling of the superior 
court.”). 
61. Id. 
62. Id.; In re Cudjo, 20 Cal. 4th 673, 687–88 (1999) (“Because the referee observes the demeanor of 
testifying witnesses, and thus has an advantage in assessing their credibility, this court ordinarily gives great 
weight to the referee’s findings on factual questions, but this deference is arguably inappropriate when the 
referee’s factual findings are based entirely on documentary evidence.”). 
63. Medwed, supra note 10, at 1457 (“Upon receipt of a petition, the court must evaluate whether it states 
a prima facie case[.]”). 
64. Medwed, supra note 10, at 1455 (“As for the level of evidentiary proof, California state petitioners for 
the write bear a heavy burden in both initially pleading for relief and later proving their claims.”). 
65. Id.  
66. In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 780–81 (1993) (“The court must and will assume, however, that a petition 
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If the court finds a prima facie case has been stated, it will issue an order to 
show cause, which is addressed to the custodian of the petitioner.67 Once the 
order to show cause has issued, the custodian must reply with his reasons for 
keeping the petitioner in custody.68 The petitioner may then file a “traverse” in 
response to the custodian’s allegations.69 If the court decides that the petitioner 
has alleged facts which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the court 
may order an evidentiary hearing if any further factual development is 
necessary.70 If the court finds that habeas relief is warranted, the petitioner may 
be released from custody.71 
On the other hand, if the court finds that the petitioner is not entitled to 
habeas relief, the court may deny the petition summarily.72 In doing so, the court 
is not required to write a full opinion explaining the denial of the petition.73 While 
superior courts are required to give a “brief statement of the reasons for the 
denial,”74 courts of appeal and the California Supreme Court may deny the 
petition without explanation.75 If the court denies relief, the petitioner may file a 
new petition with a higher court.76 Once the petitioner’s claim has been denied by 
 
for writ of habeas corpus includes all claims known to the petitioner.”). 
67. CAL. CT. R. 4.551(c). The order to show cause may be directed to the custodian or the real party in 
interest, such as the Attorney General. People v. Romero, 8 Cal. 4th 728, 737 (1994); see  also In re Williams, 7 
Cal. 4th 572, 586 (1994) (explaining the Attorney General’s response to the order to show cause). The custodian 
must be a person and is often the warden or the superintendent of the prison in which the petitioner is held. See 
CAL. PENAL CODE §1477 (West 2006) (describing the custodian as “the person who has custody over the 
petitioner”); PRISON LAW OFFICE, STATE HABEAS PROCEDURE: A MANUAL FOR CALIFORNIA PRISONERS, 16 
(2008) available at http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/STATEHABEAS2008.pdf (directing petitioners to list the 
warden or superintendent of the prison as the custodian on their state habeas petitions) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). Once the order to show cause has issued, “the court must appoint counsel for any 
unrepresented petitioner who desires counsel but cannot afford counsel.” CAL. CT. R. 4.551(c). 
68. Medwed, supra note 10, at 1457. 
69. Id. at 1457–58. 
70. Id. at 1458. 
71. Id. at 1453 (“The form of habeas corpus relief, if and when granted, often consisted of release from 
custody and a rescission of further proceedings against the petitioner.”). 
72. Id. at 1457; In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 781 (“Summary disposition of a petition that does not state a 
prima facie case for relief is the rule.”). 
73. Seligman, supra note 35, at 471 (“State courts do not always issue written opinions in deciding 
criminal cases . . . . Instead, state courts frequently issue ‘summary dispositions,’ which are decision 
unaccompanied by a written opinion.”); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784 (2011) (addressing cases in 
which “a state court’s order is unaccompanied by an opinion explaining the reasons relief has been denied”). 
74.  CAL. CT. R. 4.551(g) (“Any order denying a petition for writ of habeas corpus must contain a brief 
statement of the reasons for the denial. An order only declaring the petition ‘denied’ is insufficient.”). 
75. Seligman, supra note 35, at 471 (“State courts do not always issue written opinions in deciding 
criminal cases . . . . Instead, state courts frequently issue ‘summary dispositions,’ which are decision 
unaccompanied by a written opinion.”); Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 784 (addressing cases in which “a state 
court’s order is unaccompanied by an opinion explaining the reasons relief has been denied”). “A summary 
denial may simply state, in a single sentence, that the petition is denied.” Seligman, supra note 35, at 502. For 
the purposes of this Comment, “summary denial” refers to cases in which no opinion was issued. 
76. Medwed, supra note 10, at 1458 (“[W]hile technically prevented from appealing a superior court’s 
denial of a habeas corpus petition, litigants may simply file a new petition in the court of appeal.”). 
05_SCHRIEVER_V1_1-16-14-1_FINAL_05.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2014 11:05 AM 
2014 / Why California Should Care About Habeas Corpus 
772 
the California Supreme Court, the petitioner is deemed to have exhausted state 
remedies for that claim and may move on to pursue habeas relief in federal 
court.77 
D. Repetitious Claims and Successive Petitions 
After a petitioner seeking habeas relief has filed his first habeas petition in 
state court, two procedural issues arise should the petitioner have additional 
claims or disagree with the court about the treatment of the initial claims: 
repetitive claims and successive petitions. The general rule is that a habeas court 
will not consider repetitive claims.78 Once a habeas court has considered a claim 
and rejected it, the court will not consider repeated applications for habeas corpus 
relief for that same claim.79 
A successive petition refers to any petition filed after the initial petition is 
filed. Because a court assumes that all known claims were included in the initial 
petition, a court’s default position is that it will not hear successive petitions.80 
While the reviewing court has discretion to hear successive petitions and does so 
on occasion, the California Supreme Court is critical of this practice.81 
In evaluating whether to hear a successive petition on the merits, the 
reviewing court will consider whether the petitioner has pursued his claims with 
due diligence.82 The petitioner must explain why the new claims were not 
presented in the initial habeas petition; and the court will evaluate whether or not 
the given justification is adequate.83 The petitioner bears the burden of alleging 
the facts on which he relies to explain the delay and justify the successive 
 
77. Harris v. Superior Court, 500 F.2d 1124, 1128–29 (1974) (“However, when the California Supreme 
Court denies a habeas petition without opinion or citation, or when it otherwise decides on the merits of the 
petition, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.”); see also Emily Garcia Uhrig, A Case for a Constitutional 
Right to Counsel in Habeas Corpus, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 541, 576 (2009) (“To raise a claim under 2254, a 
petitioner must first exhaust the claim by presenting it to the highest state court, unless state law lacks an avenue 
for doing so.”). 
78. In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 767. 
79. Id. (“It has long been the rule that absent a change in the applicable law or the facts, the court will not 
consider repeated applications for habeas corpus presenting claims that have previously been rejected.”). 
80. In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 774 (“[T]he court has emphasized that repetitive successive petitions are not 
permitted . . . Before a successive petition will be entertained on its merits the petitioner must explain and 
justify the failure to present claims in a timely manner in his prior petition or petitions.”). “With the exception 
of petitions which allege facts demonstrating that a fundamental miscarriage of justice has occurred, an 
exception addressed below, unjustified successive petitions will not be entertained on their merits.” Id. at 775. 
81. 36 Cal. Jur. 3d Habeas Corpus §7 (citing In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 768–69) (“Indeed, the supreme 
court has noted, critically, that on the occasion the merits of successive petitions have been considered 
regardless of whether the claim was raised on appeal or in a prior petition, and without consideration of whether 
the claim could and should have been presented in a prior petition.”). 
82. In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 774–75 (“A petitioner will be expected to demonstrate due diligence in 
pursuing potential claims.”). 
83. Id. 
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petition.84 If the petitioner alleges that the facts underlying the claim were not 
known at the time of the initial petition, then the new claims must have been filed 
as “promptly as reasonably possible.”85 
E. Timeliness 
California’s timeliness requirements for habeas petitions are governed by 
three major cases:86 In re Clark, In re Robbins,87 and In re Gallego.88 Unlike most 
other states, California does not have a defined period in which petitions for 
habeas relief must be filed.89 Instead, California courts apply a “general 
‘reasonableness’ standard.”90 A habeas petition is timely filed if it is filed “as 
promptly as the circumstances allow.”91 A petitioner must seek relief without 
“substantial delay;” a petition that is substantially delayed may be denied as 
untimely.92 Delay is measured from “the time the petitioner or counsel knew, or 
reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim 
and the legal basis for the claim.”93 
To inform the court’s assessment, a petitioner must state when he first 
learned of the claim asserted and explain why he did not file the petition earlier.94 
In capital cases, a petitioner is entitled to a presumption of timeliness if the 
petition is filed within ninety days of the final due date for filing the appellant’s 
reply brief on direct appeal.95 In non-capital cases, the petitioner bears “the 
burden of establishing (i) absence of substantial delay, (ii) good cause for the 




86. Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1125 (2011). 
87. 18 Cal. 4th 770 (1998). 
88. 18 Cal. 4th 825 (1998). 
89. Walker, 131 S. Ct. at 1125. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 1124 (citing In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 765 (1993)). 
92. Id. at 1124–25. 
93. Id. at 1124 (citing In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 787 (1998)). 
94. Id. (citing In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th at 780). For example, in In re Perez, a three-year delay was 
sufficiently explained by petitioner’s allegations “that when he entered the state prison system he had not yet 
completed seventh grade in school and knew nothing of legal rights or procedures, and that he has diligently 
used the limited opportunities available to prisoners for legal research and the preparation of legal documents.” 
65 Cal. 2d 224, 228 (1966). “By contrast, an 11-year delay in making a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel based on failure to present evidence diminished capacity known to defendant at the time of trial and 
when earlier petitions had been filed was held to be unjustified” in another case. In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 786 
(citing People v. Jackson, 10 Cal. 3d 265, 268–69 (1973)). 
95. In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th at 779. 
96. Walker, 131 S. Ct. at 1124 (citing In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th at 780). 
05_SCHRIEVER_V1_1-16-14-1_FINAL_05.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2014 11:05 AM 
2014 / Why California Should Care About Habeas Corpus 
774 
When a petition is not timely filed and the delay is not justified, the court 
will deny the petition.97 If a petition is untimely, the court may signal this by 
denying the petition summarily and citing one of the three governing decisions 
(i.e., Clark, Robbins, or Gallego).98 However, the California Supreme Court may 
also deny untimely petitions on the merits.99 This is possible because California 
courts have discretion to excuse an untimely petition in order to deny it, 
summarily or otherwise, on the merits.100 
F. Procedural Default and California’s Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice 
Exception 
The general rule in California is that successive and/or untimely petitions 
will be summarily denied, unless the petitioner provides justification for failing 
to present all known claims in a single, timely petition.101 However, like federal 
law, there is an exception to this rule for actual innocence claims.102 In order to 
qualify for this exception, the petitioner must allege facts that if true, would 
establish a “fundamental miscarriage of justice occurred as a result of the 
proceedings leading to conviction.”103 This exception allows the court to hear the 
claim on the merits, even though it is being raised for the first time in a 
successive petition or a petition that has been delayed without sufficient 
justification.104 Although actual innocence is a ground for habeas relief, the 
California Supreme Court has cautioned against relying on “eleventh-hour” 
habeas petitions to attain a stay of execution, as doing so would constitute an 
abuse of the writ and would not necessarily be granted.105 
 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 1125. 
99. Id. at 1126; see, e.g., In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th at 779 (“[A]ll of the claims raised in the petition must 
be rejected on the merits, and . . . most claims must also be rejected on various procedural grounds.”). 
100. Id. 
101. In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 797 (1993). 
102. Id. at 797–98. The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception actually provides four avenues for 
the exception, only one of which is actual innocence. Id.  
103. Id.  
A fundamental miscarriage of justice will have occurred in any proceeding which it can be 
demonstrated: (1) that error of constitutional magnitude led to a trial that was so fundamentally 
unfair that absent the error, no reasonable jury or judge would have convicted the petitioner; (2) that 
the petitioner is actually innocent of the crime or crimes of which the petitioner was convicted; (3) 
that the death penalty was imposed by a sentencing authority which had such a grossly misleading 
profile of the petitioner before it that absent the trial error or omission no reasonable judge or jury 
would have imposed a sentence of death; (4) that the petitioner was convicted or sentenced under an 
invalid statute.  
Id. Under the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception, a petitioner alleging actual innocence must 
convince the court that the new evidence would “undermine the entire prosecution case and point unerringly to 
innocence,” which is a “heavy burden” to satisfy. Id. at 798 n.33. 
104. In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 798. 
105. Id.; Catlin v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 300, 308 (2011). 
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Significantly, California law does not require that there be an independent 
constitutional violation that contributed to the verdict in order to grant habeas 
relief in the case of a petitioner claiming actual innocence.106 If the petitioner 
claiming actual innocence can satisfy the evidentiary burden, habeas relief may 
be granted even absent an independent constitutional violation.107 
IV. FEDERAL BARRIERS TO RELIEF FOR CALIFORNIA PETITIONERS 
The significance of the problems with the current state of habeas corpus law 
is highlighted by an examination of how federal and state habeas law work 
together to limit each other, and thereby limit potential relief for prisoners. This 
Part discusses the barriers that California state prisoners face in obtaining federal 
post-conviction relief. This Part then explains why it is crucial that state habeas 
petitioners are provided with a meaningful opportunity for relief in state court. 
A. Roadblocks to Federal Review 
Much has been written about the current state of federal habeas corpus law, 
and many scholars are convinced federal habeas relief is no longer a viable 
option for most state prisoners.108 The current federal system has been described 
as “unworkable” and “perverse,”109 and a habeas petitioner’s chances of success 
in federal court as “microscopic.”110 Empirical research supports this conclusion: 
federal habeas relief is granted in less than one-percent of cases.111 
1. Statute of Limitations 
The unavailability of federal habeas relief for state prisoners is due, in large 
part, to the procedural roadblocks created by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
 
106. In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 797. 
107. Id. 
108. See Primus, supra note 33, at 4 (“Federal habeas review has become unworkable . . . the system 
grants relief to almost nobody.”); Medwed, supra note 10, at 1444 (“Federal habeas corpus has effectively 
vanished as a viable post-conviction remedy for potentially innocent state prisoners over the past decade.”); 
Tankard, supra note 33, at 780–82 (“As one commentator put it, federal habeas review “has become a waste of 
resources while providing almost no real relief, even to deserving petitioners.”); Garcia Uhrig, supra note 30, at 
1227 (“[AEDPA] substantially narrowed the legal parameters of federal habeas review”). 
109. Primus, supra note 33, at 1 (“Experts have described the current [federal habeas] system as ‘chaos,’ 
an ‘intellectual disaster area,’ ‘a charade,’ and ‘so unworkable and perverse that reformers should feel no 
hesitation about scrapping large chunks of it.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
110. Tankard, supra note 33, at 782 (describing the rate of success of federal habeas petitions as 
“microscopic”); Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather Than the Result, 69 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 85, 89 (2012) (“In the words of Professors Nancy King and Joseph Hoffman, federal habeas review of 
state convictions has become futile, illusory, and so improbable as to be ‘microscopic.’”). 
111. Tankard, supra note 33, at 781–82 (2011) (“Forty-two percent of habeas petitions are dismissed 
without reaching the merits of any claim, while 0.34 percent of petitions are granted.”). 
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Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996.112 AEDPA created a one-year statute of 
limitations for federal review of state habeas claims and changed the standard of 
review.113 Under AEDPA, a petitioner must file his petition for federal review 
within one year of the date his state court conviction became final.114 In practice, 
the AEDPA statute of limitations provision is exceedingly complex, and it is 
difficult for prisoners and attorneys alike to figure out when a particular 
prisoner’s federal petition is actually due.115 This hardship is compounded by the 
fact that the overwhelming majority of habeas petitioners are pro se and therefore 
proceed without the assistance of an attorney.116 
The one-year statute of limitations poses grave problems for California 
petitioners who are not able to obtain habeas relief in California state court. If a 
petitioner misses the federal filing deadline, the petitioner’s claim will be 
considered time-barred and the federal court may not hear the petitioner’s claim, 
no matter how meritorious it may be.117 California prisoners may be particularly 
at risk for missing the federal filing deadline due to potential confusion stemming 
from California’s unique statute of limitations. Since California’s statute of 
limitations is open-ended, it is possible for the federal one-year statute of 
limitations to expire before the California statute of limitations has expired. 
Petitioners, who are mostly pro se litigants, may not be sophisticated enough to 
realize this, at their peril.118 
2. Procedural Default 
The doctrine of procedural default creates another potential roadblock for the 
California prisoner seeking federal habeas review.119 If the prisoner fails to 
 
112. Primus, supra note 33, at 10. 
113. Id. at 10–11. 
114. 28 U.S.C. §2255(d) (2006). 
115. See Garcia Uhrig, supra note 30, at 1252 (“The complexity of calculating AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations multiplies exponentially in light of other procedural requirements under the statute. For the typical 
pro se inmate, the interplay between these procedural doctrines can covert an otherwise herculean task to a 
literally impossible one.”). 
116. Id.; Tankard, supra note 33, at 782 (“An overwhelming ninety-five percent of habeas petitions are 
filed pro se.”). 
117. 28 U.S.C. §2255(d). However, it is possible that a petitioner who can make a credible showing of 
actual innocence may be entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. The US Supreme Court heard 
oral argument on this issue on February 25, 2013 in McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 527 (2012). One 
commentator noted that at least five justices appeared to be open to the idea that an actual innocence exception 
exists that would allow a petitioner averring such claim to have his federal petition reviewed, despite failure to 
comply with the statute of limitations. However, even in that case there would likely still be a diligence 
requirement that the petitioner would have to meet in order for the exception to apply. Actual Innocence, 
HABEAS CORPUS BLOG, http://habeascorpusblog.typepad.com/habeas_corpus_blog/actual-innocence/ 
(last visited March 20, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
118. Garcia Uhrig, supra note 30, at 1248. 
119. Under the doctrine of procedural default, a petitioner’s otherwise legitimate claim for habeas relief 
may be barred in federal court if the petitioner did not properly exhaust the claim in state court. Maples v. 
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comply with any of California’s procedural rules when applying for state habeas 
relief, the prisoner will likely find federal review of his claim barred on 
procedural grounds.120 Under the current system, a federal habeas court may not 
review a state prisoner’s claim on the merits if the prisoner’s claim is 
procedurally defaulted (meaning the prisoner failed to comply with a state 
procedural rule).121 For example, if a California petitioner did not file his petition 
for state habeas relief within a “reasonable time,” and the California state court 
therefore refused to review the petition, the federal reviewing court must also 
refuse to review the claim because the petitioner did not comply with California’s 
timeliness requirement and the claim is now procedurally defaulted.122 
Procedural default can have harsh effects on California petitioners because it 
effectively means that no court has reviewed the petitioner’s claim on the merits. 
Fortunately, federal case law provides for an actual innocence exception that 
allows a state petitioner’s claim to be heard on the merits, despite being 
procedurally defaulted, if the petitioner makes a credible showing of actual 
innocence.123 However, satisfying this exception is yet another roadblock a 
petitioner must maneuver around in order to have his claim heard in federal 
court. 
3. Federal Grounds for Relief 
The standard of review in federal court poses an additional problem for the 
California petitioner seeking federal habeas relief. Even if the petitioner has 
timely filed his federal petition and has complied with the necessary California 
procedural rules, the petitioner is still unlikely to obtain relief in federal court.124 
Under AEDPA, “if the state court denies the [petitioner’s] claim on the merits, 
the claim is barred in federal court unless one [of two] exceptions . . . applies.”125 
First, where a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court, a federal 
court may grant relief if the state court proceeding “resulted in a decision that 
 
Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 922 (2012). 
120. Id. A federal court may not hear a state petitioner’s claims on the merits “when (1) ‘a state court has 
declined to address those claims because the prisoner failed to meet a state procedural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the 
state judgment rests on independent and adequate state procedural grounds.’” Id. 
121. Id. 
122. See Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1128 (2011) (holding that California’s timeliness rule 
constituted an independent and adequate state law for purposes of procedural default). 
123. Mattingly, supra note 18, at 535. To qualify for the actual innocence exception, the petitioner must 
demonstrate that an alleged constitutional violation has “probably resulted in the conviction of one who is 
actually innocent.” Hertz & Liebman, supra note 12, at 1523 (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 
(1986)).  
124. See Primus, supra note 33, at 11 (“For the few petitioners able to maneuver through the procedural 
barriers and have their claim heard on the merits, the federal courts could only grant relief if the underlying state 
decision was ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’”). 
125. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011).  
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was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”126 
Significantly, it is not enough that the state court’s application of federal law was 
wrong—it must have been unreasonably wrong.127 Otherwise, the federal court is 
prohibited from granting relief.128 
The requirement that the state court’s decision has to be unreasonably wrong 
is further complicated by California state courts’ practice of summarily denying 
the majority of state habeas petitions.129 When a petition is denied summarily, the 
court is not required to explain its reasons for denying the petition.130 
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court specifically held that a claim 
denied summarily (i.e., without explanation) is presumed to have been 
adjudicated on the merits.131 The petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this 
presumption and may only do so by “showing there was no reasonable basis for 
the court to deny relief.”132 
Thus, due to the frequent use of summary denials, the majority of California 
state habeas petitioners face a significant obstacle133 in obtaining federal review 
of their claims: in the absence of any indication as to why each state court denied 
 
126. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) (2006). 
Federal habeas relief may not be granted for claims subject to 2254(d) [of AEDPA] unless it is 
shown the earlier state court’s decision was ‘contrary to’ federal law then clearly established in the 
holdings of [the U.S. Supreme Court]; or that it ‘involved an unreasonable application of’ such law; 
or that it ‘was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts’ in light of the record before the 
state court. 
Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 785 (internal citations omitted). 
127. Primus, supra note 33, at 11 (“Under AEDPA, it is not enough if a state court decision was wrong: it 
has to have been reasonably wrong.”); Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 785 (“For purposes of (AEDPA), ‘an 
unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.’”). 
128. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d). For example, in Harrington v. Richter, the Supreme Court emphasized that in a 
Strickland case (ineffective assistance of counsel) adjudicated in California state court, the question is not 
whether the attorney’s performance fell below the Strickland standard of care, but whether the state court’s 
application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable. 131 S. Ct. at 785 (“The pivotal question is whether the 
state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable. This is different from asking whether defense 
counsel’s performance fell below the Strickland standard.”). Thus, even if it were clear that the attorney’s 
performance fell below the Strickland standard, the federal court could not grant relief because the petitioner 
had not shown that the state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable. See id. at 792 (reversing the 
Ninth Circuit’s grant of habeas relief because the “California Supreme Court’s decision on the merits . . . 
required more deference than it received”). 
129. See Seligman, supra note 35, at 471 (noting that ninety-seven percent of state habeas petitions are 
denied summarily). 
130. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 785 (“This Court now holds and reconfirms that 2254(d) [of AEDPA] does 
not require a state court to give its reasons before its decisions can be deemed to have been ‘adjudicated on the 
merits.’”). 
131. Id. at 784–85 (“When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has 
denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any 
indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.”). 
132. Id. at 784.  
133. Id. at 786 (describing the requirement that petitioners show the state court’s decision was 
unreasonable as “difficult to meet”). 
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their claims, these petitioners must convince the federal court that either their 
claims were not adjudicated on the merits (despite the presumption otherwise), or 
the state court was unreasonably wrong in denying relief.134 Significantly, even if 
a petitioner can demonstrate he has a strong case for relief, that will not be 
enough to show the state court’s application of federal law was unreasonable. 
Thus, even a strong case for relief is likely to be unsuccessful in federal court.135 
The only other situation in which a federal court can grant relief when a 
claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court is where the state court 
proceeding “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court 
proceeding.”136 The federal court, however, is required to presume that any 
factual determinations made by the state court are correct.137 To obtain relief, the 
petitioner must rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing 
evidence.”138 As will be discussed in Part V, the clear and convincing evidence 
standard is a formidable hurdle and is extremely difficult to meet.139  
Furthermore, the actually innocent California petitioner will not be able to 
satisfy this standard if he cannot allege a constitutional violation in addition to 
his claim of innocence.140 While under California law a petitioner may state a 
claim for habeas relief by alleging a bare claim of actual innocence,141 this is not 
true in federal court.142 Under federal law, innocence is not enough.143 
Consequently, California prisoners who are unable to allege a separate 
constitutional violation will be unable to obtain relief in federal court; for such 
prisoners, California state court is the only possible forum in which habeas relief 
can be obtained.144 
B. Opportunity for State Relief Is Crucial in Light of Barriers to Federal Relief 
Given the procedural jungle awaiting California prisoners, those seeking 
federal habeas relief are almost certain to face a closed door when they proceed 
to federal court.145 Of course, those in favor of narrowing the availability of 
 
134. Primus, supra note 33, at 11. 
135. See Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (“It bears repeating that even a strong case for relief does not mean 
that the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.”).  
136. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2006). 
137. Id. § 2254(e). 
138. Id. 
139. Id. §2254(d). 
140. Hertz & Liebman, supra note 12, at 99 (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993)). 
141. In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 797 (1993). 
142. Hertz & Liebman, supra note 12, at 99 (citing Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404). 
143. Id. 
144. See infra Part II. 
145. See supra Part IV. See also Tankard, supra note 33, at 781–82 (2011) (“Forty-two percent of habeas 
petitions are dismissed without reaching the merits of any claim, while 0.34 percent of petitions are granted.”). 
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federal habeas review would see the difficulty of obtaining federal relief as a 
cause for celebration, indicating the system is working as intended.146 From this 
perspective, the bar of federal habeas relief must be set high because state 
courts—not federal courts—are the intended forums for resolving post-
conviction claims attacking state court judgments.147 Indeed, AEDPA modified 
federal habeas law with this principle of federalism in mind.148 But even this 
perspective underscores one critical point: it flows from the premise that state 
prisoners’ post-conviction claims are being given a full and fair hearing in state 
court.149 
The premise that state courts provide fair and meaningful opportunities for 
post-conviction relief is a significant one. It underlies arguments in support of the 
status quo as well as those in favor of narrowing the scope of federal habeas 
review.150 Because so much depends on this premise, its importance cannot be 
overstated. As one scholar suggests, the entire constitutionality of AEDPA may 
depend on state courts providing a fair opportunity for review.151 If state courts 
are not providing this opportunity, not only is the state system failing to perform 
its assigned duty, but also the foundation of the current deferential federal system 
will fall apart. 
At least this much is clear under the current habeas system: if state courts are 
supposed to function as the primary vehicle for resolving state post-conviction 
claims, then it is crucial these courts provide prisoners with a meaningful 
opportunity for relief. If this is not done, state prisoners are essentially left 
 
146. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (Kennedy, J.) (“If this standard is difficult to meet, 
that is because it was meant to be.”). 
147. Id. (“[AEDPA] Section 2254(d) is part of the basic structure of federal habeas jurisdiction, designed 
to confirm that state courts are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions.”). 
148. Id.; Marceau, supra note 110, at 85 (citing Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 
(2001)(“[E]xplaining that Congress enacted AEDPA both to codify preexisting judge-made doctrines that 
restricted the habeas corpus remedy for state prisoners and to impose some new restrictions, all for the purpose 
of furthering the principles of comity, finality, and federalism.”) (internal citations omitted); Degrate, supra 
note 15, at 86 (“Federalism is deeply rooted in [AEDPA].”). 
149. See Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 787 (“[AEDPA] Section 2254(d) is part of the basic structure of 
federal habeas jurisdiction, designed to confirm that state courts are the principal forum for asserting 
constitutional challenges to state convictions.”) (emphasis added). 
150. Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Right Problem; Wrong Solution, 1 CAL. L. REV. 49, 53 
(2010) (“[F]ederal courts continue to entertain, on a routine basis, vast numbers of habeas petitions filed by 
convicted state prisoners. This remains true even though such prisoners today generally enjoy the full 
opportunity to seek judicial review in state court for asserted violations of their federal constitutional rights.”) 
(emphasis added); Primus, supra note 33, at 4–5 (“[Hoffman and King] propose eliminating federal habeas 
review entirely for most state prisoners and reallocating the resources currently expended on federal habeas to 
improve the quality of defense representation throughout the country.”). 
151. Marceau, supra note 110, at 89 (observing that “AEDPA’s deference is conditional—there is a quid 
pro quo that states earn the newfound deference enshrined in AEDPA by developing state review systems that 
are fair and reliable” and that “AEDPA’s constitutionality may be dependent upon full and fair state 
procedures.”). 
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without a remedy since federal habeas relief is unlikely.152 If California courts are 
not willing to grant relief to deserving petitioners, and federal courts are not able 
to grant relief or even to review the claims, these prisoners are out of options.153 
For many of California inmates, this could mean years behind bars—or even 
death in some cases—for crimes they did not commit.154 
V. PROBLEMS WITH CALIFORNIA LAW 
This Part first discusses the infrequency with which California state courts 
grant habeas relief, and argues that the rate of wrongful convictions demonstrates 
there are prisoners in California who deserve habeas relief, but are not receiving 
it. This Part then considers two possible explanations for why relief is not granted 
more frequently in California: claims may not be reviewed with sufficient care, 
and the legal standard for presenting new evidence for actual innocence claims is 
too high. 
A. Frequency of Habeas Relief in California and the Incidence of Wrongful 
Convictions 
As discussed above, it is crucial that California state courts provide 
petitioners with a meaningful opportunity for post-conviction relief.155 However, 
it is unclear whether state courts are actually providing such opportunities. In 
California, over ninety-seven percent of state habeas claims are summarily 
denied.156 Evidentiary hearings are rarely granted.157 
One possible explanation is that the courts are rightly denying the majority of 
state habeas petitions because most petitioners are not deserving of relief. 
However, the wave of exonerations over the last two decades158 suggests that the 
infrequency with which California grants state habeas relief does not accurately 
reflect the numbers of prisoners deserving relief.159 As of the time of this 
 
152. Id. (“As the role of deciding the substantive law, often with binding and nearly unreviewable 
finality, falls to the states, it becomes increasingly important to ensure that states’ post-conviction systems are 
procedurally fair and reliable on an individual and a systemic level.”). 
153. Jessica D. Gabel & Margaret D. Wilkinson, “Good” Science Gone Bad: How the Criminal Justice 
System Can Redress the Impact of Flawed Forensics, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1001, 1020 (2008) (“When a motion for 
post-conviction relief or a new trial petition are no longer available, even an innocent prisoner has little hope of 
gaining freedom.”). 
154. Id. California inmate Kevin Cooper is one casualty of the current system. Despite Judge Fletcher’s 
proclamation in Cooper v. Brown that “[t]he State of California may be about to execute an innocent man,” Mr. 
Cooper remains on death row. 565 F.3d 581, 581 (2009). 
155. See supra Part IV. 
156. Seligman, supra note 35, at 471.  
157. Medwed, supra note 10, at 1458 (2007). 
158. Id. at 1439. 
159. Id. at 1466–67 (describing how potential post-conviction remedies in California intersect to make it 
difficult for actually innocent state prisoners to achieve relief in California using newly discovered evidence 
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Comment, over 1,200 prisoners have been exonerated nationwide,160 but there is 
no consensus on what this figure means. 
While United States Supreme Court Justice Scalia has suggested that these 
exonerations show that the system is working,161 social science research supports 
a different conclusion: exonerations represent only a small percentage of all false 
convictions.162 Thus, the logical conclusion is that there are people who were 
falsely convicted, but have not yet been exonerated and remain in prison.163 
B. Is Lack of Proper Scrutiny the Problem? 
Due to the elusive nature of wrongful convictions, it is difficult to predict 
with specificity how frequently they occur.164 However, social science researchers 
have made certain estimates based on the wrongful convictions about which we 
know.165 The results of these studies suggest part of the reason more prisoners are 
not exonerated is because not all claims are reviewed with the same level of care. 
Understandably, courts scrutinize death sentences most closely because of 
the severity and irreversible nature of the punishment.166 In one comprehensive 
study, researchers concluded that “if we reviewed prison sentences with the same 
level of care that we devote to death sentences, there would have been over 
28,500 non-death-row exonerations in the past 15 years rather than the 255 that 
have in fact occurred [at the time of the study].”167 
Other examples support the conclusion that additional review would lead to 
additional exonerations. For example, in one study of habeas petitions filed by 
 
claims and commenting that “[t]his phenomenon is at odds with recent developments, both in California and 
across the nation, which suggest that wrongful convictions occur with greater frequency than ever imagined.”). 
160. NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ 
about.aspx (last visited April 20, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). This statistic is not limited to 
DNA-based exonerations. 
161. Rory K. Little, Addressing the Evidentiary Sources of Wrongful Convictions: Categorical Exclusion 
of Evidence in Capital Statutes, 37 SW. L. REV. 965, 979 (2008) (“In his remarkable 2006 concurrence in 
Kansas v. Marsh, Justice Scalia asserts that the recent revelation of actually innocent exonerees ‘demonstrates 
not the failure of the system but its success.’”); Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 193 (2006) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“[The dissent] speaks as though exoneration came about through the operation of some outside 
force to correct the mistakes of our legal system, rather than as a consequence of our legal system. Reversal of 
an erroneous conviction on appeal or on habeas . . . demonstrates not the failure of the system but its success.”). 
162. Samuel R. Gross and Barbara O’Brien, Frequency and Predictors of False Conviction: Why We 
Know So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 927, 940 (2008) (“[W]e do not 
know how many false convictions occur, but it is clear that there are many more false convictions than 
exonerations.”); id. at 938 (“There are virtually no exonerations for the misdemeanors and nonviolent felonies 
that constitute the vast majority of all criminal convictions, and probably include the majority of false criminal 
convictions as well.”) (emphasis added). 
163. Id. at 927. 
164. Id. at 958–59. 
165. Id. 
166. Tavris, supra note 10, at 130. 
167. Id. 
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death row inmates, researchers found that when courts fully reviewed the cases, 
“courts reversed an alarming sixty-eight percent of fully reviewed verdicts ‘due 
to serious errors.’”168 In another instance, a district attorney in Dallas took the 
initiative to review previously denied innocence claims within his county (with 
the help of the Texas Innocence Project).169 From that review alone, twenty-one 
exonerations resulted over a four-year period.170 
These results are particularly troubling because in many cases there is no 
way to determine from the state court record whether the court conducted a 
thorough review of the case.171 Since the majority of habeas claims are denied 
summarily, there is often no explanation of why the court denied relief.172 Thus, it 
is unclear whether California prisoners are truly receiving meaningful review of 
their habeas claims in state court. 
C. Legal Standard for Relief Is Too High 
Even if a potentially innocent petitioner’s claim is heard on the merits and 
meaningfully considered, there is still the problem of the legal standard for relief: 
the petitioner must provide new evidence that “point[s] unerringly to 
innocence.”173 This burden is almost impossible to meet, even for innocent 
prisoners.174 
The incidence of improper forensic evidence illustrates the problem with this 
stringent standard.175 Use of improper or unvalidated forensic science is a known 
cause of wrongful convictions.176 To illustrate this concern, suppose an innocent 
petitioner was convicted based largely on forensic evidence presented at trial. 
 
168. Tankard, supra note 33, at 783 (concluding, based on this figure, that the “reason for the low success 
rate of non-capital habeas claimants likely has at least as much to do with a lack of representation [by an 
attorney] as with a scarcity of meritorious claims”). 
169. Joseph L. Hoffman, Innocence and Federal Habeas After AEDPA: Time for the Supreme Court to 
Act, 24 FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER 4, 303 (2011).  
170. Id.  
171. Medwed, supra note 10, at 1467 n.158 (2007) (“‘As California’s prison population and incarceration 
rate continue to increase, a sample of habeas petitions filed within San Diego fails to demonstrate that prisoners’ 
claims are uniformly being given (1) prompt and fair consideration (2) on the merits (3) with appropriate 
assistance of counsel.’”). 
172. Seligman, supra note 35, at 471. 
173. In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 766 (1993); In re Hardy, 41 Cal. 4th 977, 1016 (2007). 
174. Gabel, supra note 153, at 1016 (using California’s newly discovered evidence standard to illustrate 
that “even where [a claim of bare innocence] is cognizable, the standards a prisoner must meet to establish 
entitlement to relief can be quite strict and nearly impossible to meet”); Medwed, supra note 10, at 1439 (2007) 
(describing the “points unerringly to innocence” standard as “remarkably severe”). 
175. Gabel, supra, note 153, at 1021–22. 
176. Unreliable or Improper Forensic Evidence, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
understand/Unreliable -Limited-Science.php (last visited March 20, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (“In more than 50% of DNA exonerations, unvalidated or improper forensic science contributed to the 
wrongful conviction.”). Unvalidated or improper forensic science is the “second-greatest contributor to 
wrongful convictions that have been overturned with DNA testing.” Id.  
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Suppose further that after the trial and appeal phase, the particular type of 
forensic evidence used against the petitioner is conclusively proven to be junk 
science, i.e., not sufficiently reliable to form the basis for a criminal conviction. 
So far, things are looking up for this innocent petitioner: the foundations of the 
evidence against him have been completely discredited. 
However, when the petitioner presents a California state court with his newly 
discovered evidence claim, a peculiar situation results. Although the petitioner 
can prove the forensic evidence has been discredited and therefore calls the basis 
of his conviction into question, he still does not meet the standard for relief in 
California.177 This is because discrediting the evidence against him is not the 
same as providing affirmative evidence that points unerringly to his innocence.178 
The absence of evidence against him does not affirmatively indicate that he is 
innocent.179 Thus, the innocent petitioner who cannot provide affirmative 
evidence pointing to innocence could be kept in prison, despite having 
discredited the bulk of the evidence against him.180 
VI. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
This Part will discuss two possible solutions for the current habeas problem 
with respect to wrongful convictions. First, the legal standard of relief should be 
lowered to the standard for new trial motions. Second, all courts should be 
required to provide at least a skeletal explanation of their reasoning when issuing 
summary denials. 
A. Lower the Legal Standard for Relief 
Recognizing the significant obstacles that actually innocent prisoners face 
under California law, legal scholar Daniel Medwed has proposed that California 
change its legal standard for claims based on newly discovered evidence.181 
Rather than requiring prisoners to provide evidence that “points unerringly to 
innocence,” Professor Medwed suggests that prisoners be required to provide 
 
177. Gabel, supra note 153, at 1021 (“[D]iscrediting of a forensic testing technique may not be able to 
make a sufficient showing of innocence.”); id. at 1023 (“Thus, a prisoner challenging his or her conviction in a 
jurisdiction that requires a strong showing of innocence probably will not be entitled to relief even if he or she 
conclusively shows that a forensic testing technique has insufficient value.”) 
178. Id. at 1021–22 (“The discrediting of forensic technique probably cannot be considered ‘affirmative 
evidence’ that ‘unquestionably establishes’ a prisoner’s innocence. Even assuming that a forensic technique was 
shown to be completely unreliable, it will not provide affirmative evidence of a prisoner’s innocence.”). 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Medwed, supra note 10, at 1475–76. Medwed offers this suggestion as one of several “feasible 
micro-level solutions” that, while piecemeal, would be a “marked improvement” to California law. However, he 
ultimately recommends that California undertake a more full-scale “revamping of [its] treatment of newly 
discovered evidence claims” and adopt a system more similar to that of New York. Id. at 1475–78. 
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“evidence that would have probably changed the outcome at trial” (hereafter “the 
new trial standard”).182 Under this standard, a prisoner seeking state habeas relief 
based on newly discovered evidence would be required to show that the new 
evidence: 
(1)  could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and 
produced at trial; 
(2)  is not merely cumulative; 
(3)  is not merely impeaching or contradicting a witness; 
(4)  would render a different result probable on retrial of the case; and 
(5)  is shown by the best evidence of which the case admits.183 
This standard would greatly benefit actually innocent prisoners because it is 
less burdensome to meet and would therefore provide deserving prisoners with a 
fair chance of obtaining relief in state court.184 As Professor Medwed explains, 
this standard is “rigorous . . . [but] not insurmountable for defendants” and 
“afford[s] prisoners a chance to pursue their claims in full and fair fashion.”185 
Should California adopt the new trial standard, it would not be alone: Arizona186 
and Florida187 use a similar standard for newly discovered evidence claims. 
  
 
182. Id. at 1475. This is the same standard that California state prisoners seeking a new trial must satisfy. 
Id. 
183. Id. at 1469 (2007). 
184. Id. (describing the new trial standard as “rigorous . . . [but] not insurmountable”). 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 1475 n.207 (citing ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(e)) 
Arizona’s criminal procedure code provides post-conviction relief when: “Newly discovered 
material facts probably exist and such facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. 
Newly discovered material facts exist if: (1) The newly discovered material facts were discovered 
after the trial. (2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing the newly discovered material 
facts. (3) The newly discovered material facts are not merely cumulative or used solely for 
impeachment, unless the impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony which was of 
critical significance at trial such that the evidence probably would have changed the verdict or 
sentence.” 
Id. 
187. Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991). At the time Jones was decided, Florida law required 
that petitioners bringing newly discovered evidence claims present facts that are “of such vital nature that had 
they been know to the trial court, they conclusively would have prevented an entry of judgment.” In Jones, 
however, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that that standard was “almost impossible to meet and [ran] the 
risk of thwarting justice.” Thus, the court lowered the standard and held that newly discovered evidence must 
only be “of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.” Id. 
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1. Is the New Trial Standard Stringent Enough? 
Proponents of a stringent legal test for actual innocence claims based on 
newly discovered evidence argue that the current high standard is fair because 
petitioners have already had a trial and been convicted.188 However, this argument 
is misguided in light of the incidence of wrongful convictions.189 Clearly, 
innocent people are convicted and fail to prevail on appeal.190 The fact that a 
petitioner has had both a trial and an appeal does not indicate that justice was 
done or that the petitioner must be guilty.191 The evidence regarding wrongful 
convictions makes at least that much clear.192 Furthermore, this argument 
improperly values procedural “fairness” over determinations of guilt and 
innocence.193 Procedural fairness is not an end goal in itself; it is the means by 
which justice is achieved.194 
 
188. See, e.g., Jennifer Gwynne Case, How Wide Should the Actual Innocence Gateway Be? An Attempt 
to Clarify the Miscarriage of Justice Exception for Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 50 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 669, 697 (2008).  
By the time a petitioner reaches the habeas stage of his postconviction proceedings, he has been 
convicted of a crime by a jury of his peers. Accordingly, the petitioner is no longer entitled to the 
presumption of innocence. The higher up the postconviction process, the greater the number of 
chances the petitioner has had to demonstrate his innocence. The more chances afforded a petitioner 
to appeal his sentence, the smaller the risk that he has been wrongly convicted. In the rare cases like 
[wrongfully convicted prisoner] Beverly Monroe’s, the judicial system is likely to detect a wrongful 
conviction before the need to petition a federal court for review because of the numerous 
constitutional and statutory safeguards available in criminal cases. Moreover, executive clemency, 
the ultimate safeguard, will always be a possibility for the truly innocent prisoner. 
In re Lawley, 42 Cal.4th 1231, 1240–41 (2008). 
The rationale for applying a different, higher standard to actual innocence habeas corpus claims is 
readily explained. . .[A]ctual innocence claims based on newly discovered or nonperjured false 
testimony do not attack the procedural fairness of the trial. They concede the procedural fairness of 
the trial, but nevertheless attack the accuracy of the verdict rendered and seek a reexamination of the 
very question the jury answered: Is the defendant guilty of the charges presented? A conviction 
obtained after the constitutionally adequate trial is entitled to great weight. Accordingly, a higher 
standard properly applies to challenges to a judgment whose procedural fairness is conceded than to 
one whose procedural fairness is challenged. Metaphorically speaking, an actual innocence claim 
based on newly discovered evidence seeks a second bite of the apple. . .[without contending] that the 
first bite was rotten.  
Id. 




193. Little, supra note 161, at 976 (“The point is that, ultimately, our concern about wrongful convictions 
has to do with substantive guilt, not merely the fairness of the process.”). 
194. Peter Sessions, Swift Justice?: Imposing a Statute of Limitations on the Federal Habeas Corpus 
Petitions of State Prisoners, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1513, 1548 (1997) (“Finality is not a desirable goal in itself and 
of itself; it is only desirable as a means to justice.”); Rozier v. United States, 701 F.3d 681, 690–91 (11th Cir. 
2012) (J. Hill, dissenting). 
Due process is the defining virtue of our system of criminal justice. But we should ask ourselves 
why. Is it because it achieves finality? Or is it because we believe that, more often than not, we will 
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Moreover, the new trial standard is not too lenient. While it is lower than the 
current standard for relief, it is still difficult to satisfy.195 As one scholar noted, 
even innocent prisoners will not always be able to meet the new trial standard, as 
it can be difficult to meet each of the several requirements.196 Thus, proponents of 
a stringent legal standard for newly discovered evidence claims need not be 
concerned should California adopt the still-demanding, new trial standard. 
While the legal standard for relief should be somewhat rigorous, it should not 
be impossible to satisfy. Since we cannot completely eliminate wrongful 
convictions, “there will always be the perceived need “for some kind of ‘safety 
valve’ by which wrongful convictions can be overturned.”197 For this reason, the 
new trial standard is preferable to other standards, such as the clear and 
convincing evidence standard. Although the clear and convincing evidence 
standard may seem like a natural choice because it is the same standard used to 
grant habeas relief in federal court,198 it is still too harsh.199 For example, in 
California death-row inmate Kevin Cooper’s case, Judge McKeown expressed 
grave doubt about Cooper’s guilt and concern about using the clear and 
convincing evidence standard in actual innocence cases: 
The habeas process does not account for lingering doubt or new evidence 
that cannot leap the clear and convincing hurdle of AEDPA. Instead, we 
are left with a situation in which confidence in the [evidence] is murky at 
best, and lost, destroyed or tampered evidence cannot be factored into the 
final analysis of doubt. The result is wholly discomforting, but is one that 
the law demands.200 
Unlike the clear and convincing evidence standard, the new trial standard 
heeds the “lessons of the DNA revolution” by recognizing that wrongful 
convictions occur and providing a fair opportunity for wrongfully convicted 
prisoners to prove that they are being held unjustly. 
2. Will Lowering the Standard Allow Guilty People to Go Free? 
Whenever the notion of expanding habeas relief arises, this question surfaces 
without fail: what if guilty petitioners are set free? Admittedly, there is always a 
 
reach a correct result where certain process is due the criminal defendant. The goal is a correct 
result—not simply the provision of process.”). 
195. Gabel, supra note 153, at 1015. 
196. Id. (“The requirements that a prisoner must meet in order to [satisfy the] new trial [standard] all but 
ensure that an innocent person in many jurisdictions will not be able to do so.”). 
197. Hoffman, supra note 169, at 301. 
198. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d) (2006). 
199. See Gabel, supra note 153, at 1023 (describing the requirement under Texas law that a prisoner 
establish a bare claim of actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence as a “Herculean task”).  
200. Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870, 1007 (9th Cir. 2007) (McKeown, J., concurring). 
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chance that guilty prisoners would be set free under the new trial standard. But 
this scenario seems unlikely. The new trial standard is hardly a free pass for 
prisoners to be released from custody—there are still standards that need to be 
met, and significant ones at that.201 Changing the legal standard for relief does not 
create new evidence that would allow a guilty prisoner to go free. If a prisoner is 
guilty, he will still have difficulty providing evidence of his innocence  sufficient 
to meet the new trial standard.202 
It is true that some petitioners would be able to secure habeas relief under the 
new trial standard who would not be able to do so under the current standard.203 
However, the fact that these prisoners would be set free is not a bad thing; in fact, 
it is desirable. If a prisoner is able to satisfy the requirements of the new trial 
standard, it means he has successfully and credibly called his guilt into 
question.204 A court which grants relief to such a prisoner is not letting a guilty 
person go free, but merely freeing someone who never should have been 
imprisoned at all. 
Furthermore, the risk that a guilty person will go free under a particular legal 
standard is both acceptable and necessary.205 At the foundation of our criminal 
justice system lays the principle that it is preferable to let a guilty person go free 
than to convict an innocent person.206 The “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard 
in criminal trials reflects this principle. Under that standard, a guilty person goes 
free not because he is innocent, but because the state could not prove he is 
guilty.207 Our system is structured to err on the side of innocence208 because a 
wrongful conviction is considered the ultimate injustice.209 As one scholar 
observes, “[i]t is impossible to overestimate the magnitude of the wrong done to 
 
201. Up the River, supra note 11, at 689. 
202. Id. ([E]ven if a factually guilty defendant were to have his new evidence claim assessed during a 
post-trial evidentiary hearing. . .he would still likely struggle to carry the burden of proving that all of the 
requirements for relief are met.”). 
203. See Medwed, supra note 10, at 1469 (describing the new trial standard as “rigorous . . . [but] not 
insurmountable”); Gabel, supra note 153, at 1016 (describing California’s newly discovered evidence standard 
as “nearly impossible to meet”). 
204. Medwed, supra note 10, at 1469 (“If a defendant satisfies [the new trial] requirements. . . . the 
defendant has raised credible doubts about his or her guilt.”). 
205. Little, supra note 161, at 976. 
206. Id. (“[I]t is ‘a fundamental value determination of our society’ that a number factually guilty 
criminal offenders should go free, rather than risk even a few wrongful convictions.”). 
207. KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1977–2009, 32 (2010), available at http://digitalcommons.law. 
scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=ncippubs (“The presumption of innocence . . . places upon 
the state the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt . . . . The presumption is based 
on the basic concept that is worse to convict an innocent person than to let a guilty person go free.”).  
208. Id. at 84 (“But that is the balance we have struck, recognizing that it is better that some guilty go free 
than the fairness of the trials be compromised and the innocent convicted.”). 
209. See id. at 4 (“This case raises the one issue that is the most feared aspect of our system – that an 
innocent man might be convicted.”).  
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an innocent person wrongfully convicted of a crime. The psychological, 
emotional, and economic harm can be equivalent to the destruction of a life.”210 
Against this backdrop, the allegation that a guilty person might be set free 
does not detract from the new trial standard’s legitimacy. 
3. Federalism and State Sovereignty Concerns 
One benefit of adopting the new trial standard is that it comports with the 
principles of federalism and respect for state sovereignty enshrined in the 
structure of the federal habeas system. Under the framework of AEDPA, state 
courts are the primary forum for resolving post-conviction constitutional 
challenges to state judgments.211 The reason federal habeas review is difficult to 
obtain is because federal review of state court judgments is considered 
undesirable. It strains the relationship between the federal and state courts as 
“[s]tate courts may resent federal, trial-level courts accepting habeas petitions 
and thus undertaking to second-guess judgments that may have been affirmed by 
the states’ highest courts.”212 Adoption of a lower legal standard of habeas relief 
in California is consistent with the principle of federalism because it increases the 
likelihood that state prisoners will obtain meaningful review of their post-
conviction claims in state court, and thus have their claims resolved in the 
preferred forum: state court.213 
Under the current legal standard for relief, it is possible that California courts 
are not considering post-conviction claims as carefully as they could be because 
the standard for relief is almost impossible to meet. State courts could correctly 
presume the overwhelming majority of petitioners will not be able to meet the 
standard and could scrutinize the claim less closely on that basis.214 However, if 
the legal standard for relief were lower, it would increase the likelihood that 
deserving petitioners could satisfy the standard, so state courts would have a 
greater need to evaluate thoroughly prisoners’ claims.215 If California courts 
 
210. Id. at 66. 
211. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (“[AEDPA] Section 2254(d) is part of the basic 
structure of federal habeas jurisdiction, designed to confirm that state courts are the principal forum for 
asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions.”).  
212. Degrate, supra note 15, at 77 (“[T]he balance of power between the state and federal government in 
the enforcement of the criminal laws of this nation has shifted back to the states based on the ‘deference’ 
[AEDPA] mandates to state court conclusions of fact and law.”).  
213. Up the River, supra note 11, at 698 n.230 (“Augmenting state review of newly discovered evidence 
claims also affirms principles of state sovereignty by limiting the likelihood of federal habeas corpus review.”). 
214. See Gabel, supra note 153, at 1016 (describing California’s newly discovered evidence standard as 
“nearly impossible to meet”).  
215. See Medwed, supra note 10, at 1469 (discussing how the new trial standard creates a 
“rigorous. . .[but] not insurmountable hurdle” for defendants and arguing that adopting this standard for newly 
discovered evidence claims would help to provide potentially innocent prisoners with a more full and fair 
opportunity for relief.); In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 803 (1993) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that 
considering each claim its particular facts would require more judicial resources). 
05_SCHRIEVER_V1_1-16-14-1_FINAL_05.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2014 11:05 AM 
2014 / Why California Should Care About Habeas Corpus 
790 
provide a better opportunity for relief to deserving petitioners, then these claims 
would be resolved in state court and would not require federal review. California 
could thus take advantage of having the first opportunity to address meritorious 
claims while avoiding unwanted meddling by federal district courts.216 
4. Finality of Judgments 
Naturally, a state has an interest in maintaining the finality of its 
judgments.217 Thus, respect for the finality of judgments is a concern in any 
habeas analysis.218 A legal standard that provides a realistic opportunity for state 
prisoners to obtain habeas relief is arguably harmful to the state’s interest in 
finality because it increases the likelihood that some judgments will be 
overturned.219 However, finality is just one policy objective:220 it must be balanced 
against other competing policy objectives.221 
Specifically, the interest in finality must be balanced against the need for 
justice and accuracy in criminal judgments.222 The conviction of an innocent 
person is an injustice that represents a breakdown in the process.223 Should an 
innocent person’s conviction stand, merely for the sake of finality? 
Finality cannot be permitted to trump justice.224 As Justice Stevens explains 
“[a]lthough we have frequently recognized the State’s interest in finality we have 
never suggested that that interest is sufficient to outweigh the individual’s claim 
to innocence . . . [T]he criminal justice system occasionally errs and . . . when it 
does, finality must yield to justice.”225 
 
216. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (“Federal habeas review of state convictions 
frustrates both the States’ sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor 
constitutional rights.”). 
217. Mattingly, supra note 18, at 533, 545. 
218.  Sessions, supra note 194, at 1544–45. 
219. See Up the River, supra note 11, at 687–88 (discussing the need to provide potentially innocent 
prisoners with a chance to prevent their newly discovered evidence in state court without unduly harming the 
interest in finality). 
220. Sessions, supra note 194, at 1555. 
221. Id. (describing “competing principles of accuracy and justice”). 
222. Up the River, supra note 11, at 688 (“Valuing finality and efficiency as assets in the world of post-
trial litigation . . . does not mean they should trump competing policy objectives, particularly the accuracy of 
criminal judgments.”); Sessions, supra note 194, at 1548 (“Balanced against our concern for the finality of state 
court judgments must be a concern for the legitimacy of those judgments.”). 
223. See Hertz & Liebman, supra note 12, at 97 (“The courts properly ought to take the fact that an 
innocent person may have been convicted . . . as one, among other, indicators that an unconstitutional 
breakdown in the process has occurred.”). 
224. Rozier v. United States, 701 F.3d 681, 690–91 (11th Cir. 2012) (Hill, J., dissenting) (“If these new 
[procedural] rules require that finality trump justice, then perhaps . . . they are unconstitutional. In any event, I 
cannot join in this elevation of form over substance; of finality over fairness.”). 
225. Mattingly, supra note 18, at 545 (citing Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 364 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
concurring)). 
05_SCHRIEVER_V1_1-16-14-1_FINAL_05.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2014 11:05 AM 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 45 
791 
The state has no interest in keeping an innocent person in prison. Doing so is 
not only unjust, but also puts society at risk because it may mean the guilty 
person remains free.226 Thus, the interest in finality should not stand in the way of 
California adopting the new trial standard. Rather, the new trial standard is 
desirable because it properly “reconciles the goal for finality with the desirability 
of affording prisoners a chance to pursue their claims in full and fair fashion.”227 
5. Judicial Economy and the Cost of Justice 
The final concern warranting consideration is judicial economy. Can the 
court system afford to lower the legal standard for relief? Will a change in the 
legal standard open the floodgates and drown the court system in habeas claims? 
The unfortunate answer is the floodgates are already open.228 Both state and 
federal courts are already submerged in habeas claims.229 Neither a higher nor 
lower standard for habeas relief is likely to change the number of claims filed for 
relief. 
There will always be guilty prisoners who file frivolous claims. These 
prisoners have nothing to lose by petitioning for habeas relief, regardless of the 
standard for relief.230 Innocent petitioners are similarly unlikely to be deterred or 
encouraged by a particular standard for relief.231 If a petitioner is innocent, he will 
likely pursue post-conviction relief regardless of the legal standard. Thus, the 
primary effect of changing the legal standard is not so much that the number of 
total habeas petitioners will change, but that more of the petitioners who warrant 
relief will be able to obtain it.232 
 
226. For example, Michael Morton spent twenty-five years in prison after a court wrongfully convicted 
him in 1987 for his wife’s murder. In 2011, DNA testing revealed that Morton was not the killer and implicated 
another man. While Morton was in prison, the other man killed another woman. Know the Cases: Michael 
Morton, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www. innocenceproject.org/Content/Michael_Morton.php, (last visited 
April 2, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
227. Medwed, supra note 10, at 1469. 
228. Tankard, supra note 33, at 782 (“Despite [the] microscopic rate of success, the cases keep pouring 
in: nearly one in five cases on the federal civil docket is filed by a prisoner and more than half of those filings 
are petitions for post-conviction relief.”). 
229. Id.; Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1125–26 (2011) (“[The California Supreme Court] rules on a 
staggering number of [habeas] petitions each year.”). 
“In fiscal year 2008–2009, the California Supreme Court issued dispositions in 3,258 original habeas 
actions . . . During a similar time period, a total of 2,210 habeas cases were on [the] Court’s docket.” 
Id. at 1126 n.2; Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784 (2011) (“[T]he California Supreme Court 
disposes of close to 10,000 cases a year, including more than 3,400 original habeas corpus 
petitions.”). 
230. Hoffman, supra note 169, at 301 (“[I]f—as seems inevitable—the convicted defendant cannot be 
made to bear any significant costs for invoking such a procedure, then most if not all defendants, whether they 
are guilty or innocent, will seek to avail themselves of the procedure [by which they may succeed on a claim of 
factual innocence]. They have everything to gain, and virtually nothing to lose.”). 
231. Id. 
232. See Up the River, supra note 11, at 689 (arguing for a relaxation of the procedural barriers to habeas 
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It is true that if California adopts the new trial standard, state courts will be 
required to expend additional judicial resources on each claim. Because a lower 
standard increases the likelihood that innocent state prisoners will be able to meet 
the legal standard for habeas relief, there will be more close cases, and courts will 
spend more time analyzing these cases.233 But in the grand scheme of the criminal 
justice system, this result is not undesirable.234 We now know that our system errs 
and that innocent people are convicted.235 Now more than ever, our courts have an 
obligation to carefully consider each claim for relief, despite the time it will take 
or the concern over expending resources on petitioners who may abuse the writ.236 
Justice Mosk describes this obligation as follows: 
I know of only one sure way to discover abuse without defeating justice: 
to examine each petition on its own facts. True, scrutiny of this sort 
requires the expense of considerable judicial resources, particularly in 
capital cases. That, however, is the cost of justice. Out of fidelity to our 
judicial oath, we must pay the price.237 
Wrongfully convicted prisoners exist within our criminal justice system238 
and deserve a fair opportunity to have their habeas claims heard. California 
should not deny innocent prisoners the opportunity for relief merely because it 
costs too much.239 “[I]n extraordinary cases, the societal interests of finality, 
comity, and conserving judicial resources ‘must yield to the imperative of 
correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration.’”240 
Can California afford to adopt the new trial standard for state habeas relief? 
In the interest of justice, California must do so. While more court resources will 
 
relief and asserting that “the legal and evidentiary standards pertaining to new trial motions . . . [are] by no 
means effortless hurdles to clear . . . . The enforcement of these . . . .standards should provide the requisite 
safeguard to prevent guilty prisoners from slipping through the opening created by removing some procedural 
roadblocks that confront newly discovered new evidence claims.”). 
233. In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 802 (1993) (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
234. See id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (arguing that the additional use of resources that would be required to 
consider each claim on its particular facts is “the cost of justice”). 
235. See About the Registry, NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/ 
special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(evidencing wrongful convictions by the number of exonerations). 
236. See In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 802 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (asserting that courts should “examine each 
petition on its own facts”); Marceau, supra note 110, at 89 (“As the role of deciding the substantive law, often 
with binding and nearly unreviewable finality, falls to the states, it becomes increasingly important to ensure 
that states’ post-conviction systems are procedurally fair and reliable on an individual and a systemic level.”). 
237. In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 802 (Mosk,, J,  dissenting). 
238. Gross, supra note 162, at 940. 
239. See supra note 237 and accompanying text. 
240. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 935 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 
(1986)). 
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be required, that is the quid pro quo of doing business in a fallible criminal 
justice system.241 
B. The Problem of Summary Denials 
In addition to adopting the new trial standard, California should consider 
reforming its use of summary denials for habeas corpus petitions in order to 
increase transparency and foster confidence in the criminal justice system. As 
discussed previously, California dismisses over ninety-seven percent of state 
prisoners’ habeas claims through summary denial.242 This means that in the 
majority of cases where habeas relief is denied, the court does not provide a 
written opinion explaining its reasons for the denial.243 
This lack of explanation causes a number of problems for wrongfully 
convicted prisoners. When a California court summarily denies a prisoner’s 
claim, the prisoner will have difficulty obtaining federal habeas review because 
summary denials are considered adjudicated on the merits, despite the fact that 
the court may have provided no explanation as to whether the petition was denied 
on the merits or on procedural grounds.244 For a prisoner whose claim was 
summarily denied, it will be difficult to convince a federal court the state court’s 
decision was “unreasonably wrong,” since the state court judgment contains no 
opinion.245 The lack of explanation accompanying summary denials operates to 
the petitioner’s direct detriment. 
The lack of explanation is a cause for concern on a broader level as well. The 
federal habeas system gives deference to state courts because it accepts that state 
courts are providing prisoners with a full and fair opportunity for judicial 
 
241. In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 802 (1993) (Mosk, J.,  dissenting). 
242. Seligman, supra note 25, at 471. “These data demonstrate that summary dispositions are the 
dominant form of resolution of state habeas proceedings in California—far more so than the previously 
available data from other states suggested.” Id. at 505–06 (explaining that this study used data from six courts of 
appeal in California over a four year period from 2006 to 2009, and concluding that “a California state habeas 
petition is almost certain to be denied summarily”). 
243. Id. While superior courts are required to provide a brief statement of reasons when summarily 
denying a petition, they are not required to issue a full opinion. As a result, summary denial orders from trial 
courts may only contain a few sentences. See, e.g., In re Stamos, 2006 WL 5710785 (2006) (denying habeas 
relief in a two-sentence order). As discussed in Part III.C, courts of appeal and the California Supreme Court are 
not required to provide any explanation at all. 
244. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (holding that a state court is not required “to give 
its reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been ‘adjudicated on the merits.’”).  
245. Seligman, supra note 35, at 494–95 (discussing the rule that state court decisions must be 
unreasonable, rather than just incorrect, in order for a federal habeas court to review a state habeas petition and 
observing that “[a]pplying this rule to summary dispositions is not straightforward. The obvious method of 
evaluating whether a state court decision is unreasonable is to evaluate whether the state court’s accompanying 
written opinion is unreasonable. [But] this is not an option with summary dispositions.”); see also Harrington, 
131 S. Ct. at 786 (describing the requirement that petitioners show the state court’s decision was unreasonable 
as “difficult to meet”). 
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review.246 However, when courts summarily dismiss the majority of claims,247 it is 
impossible to evaluate whether all state courts are truly providing prisoners with 
this opportunity.248 As one scholar observes: 
Summary dispositions are opaque, giving no outward indication of the 
deliberative processes utilized by the issuing court. A summary 
disposition may result from a conscientious evaluation of the evidence in 
light of a reasonable interpretation of governing federal law. . . . Or, it 
may result from a haphazard glance at the evidence and a cursory review 
of the law. . . . [State courts] may, in short, automatically issue summary 
denials of relief to every prisoner’s petition.249 
We know little about why the courts summarily deny so many claims.250 
Certainly it could be because relief is unwarranted, but the continuous stream251 
of wrongfully convicted prisoners suggests otherwise. 
The inability to review state courts’ reasoning is particularly troubling when 
combined with the lack of oversight surrounding state court judgments. There is 
neither mandatory oversight within California’s state court system,252 nor real 
federal oversight of California courts.253 When a lower California state court 
denies a petition for habeas relief, the petitioner cannot appeal the denial, but 
must file a new petition with a higher California court.254 Consequently, a higher 
court never directly reviews the lower court’s summary denial.255 At the same 
time, state judgments are similarly shielded from federal review as a result of 
AEDPA’s extremely deferential standard of review of state judgments.256 
 
246. Hoffman & King, supra note 150, at 53 (“[State] prisoners today generally enjoy the full opportunity 
to seek judicial review in state court for asserted violations of their federal constitutional rights.”). 
247. Seligman, supra note 35, at 471. 
248. Id. at 474 (“Summary dispositions . . . giv[e] no outward indication of the deliberative processes  
utilized by the issuing court.”). 
249. Id. 
250. Id. at 501 (“Summary dispositions are the dark matter of the judicial universe. By definition they 
lack a written opinion, and so they are not published in reporters of decisions and thus do not appear in standard 
searches of cases. As a result, their prevalence is not easily ascertainable via the typical tools of legal research. 
The existing scholarly literature contains snippets of data.”). 
251. Gross, supra note 162, at 940. 
252. Medwed, supra note 10, at 1471. 
253. Marceau, supra note 110, at 89 (“[T]he deterrence model of federal oversight” is regarded by 
scholars as “nothing more than a misguided ‘fairytale.’”). 
254. Medwed, supra note 10, at 1471. 
255. Id. (“[T]he lack of direct appellate review for the denial of a habeas corpus petition creates a 
situation in which there is no explicit check on the lower court’s treatment of an innocence claim. As a result, 
there is no genuine limit on a superior court’s ability to wield its habeas corpus power arbitrarily.”). 
256. See supra Part IV.A (discussing roadblocks prisoners face in obtaining habeas relief). 
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1. Some Explanation Should Be Required in Close Cases 
To combat this problem, California should require that all courts provide at 
least some explanation for why a habeas petition is being denied. While it may 
not be feasible to do this in every case, all courts should at a minimum provide a 
skeletal outline delineating the basis for denial in close cases. One potential 
definition for a “close case” is one where unanimity is lacking; if one justice 
believes relief should not be denied, the court must provide reasoning for the 
denial. 
However, there is a credible argument for requiring at least minimal 
explanation in every case. The overwhelming majority of habeas petitioners are 
pro se and have little assistance preparing their petitions for relief.257 As a result, 
these petitions can often be “hard-to-decipher.”258 When prisoners are unable to 
obtain habeas relief in California state court, the next step is to petition for relief 
in federal court.259 When federal staff attorneys initially screen petitions for 
federal habeas relief, they must make decisions “based on the often-hard-to-
decipher petition itself and the written record of the state proceedings,” since 
federal courts have “neither the time nor the resources to conduct their own 
investigations to determine the potential merits of a habeas petition.”260 Thus, 
minimal explanations for all summary denials would assist federal courts in 
evaluating the merits of each petition by making the written record of the state 
proceeding more substantial.  
2. Arguments Against Requiring Explanation 
In Harrington v. Richter, Justice Kennedy articulates two reasons why state 
courts should not be required to issue written opinions in every case.261 First, 
“requiring a statement of reasons could undercut state practices designed to 
preserve the integrity of the case-law tradition.”262 Second, the ability to issue 
summary decisions without a written opinion “can enable a state judiciary to 
concentrate its resources on the cases where opinions are most needed.”263 Thus, 
any proposed change to state summary disposition procedures must factor in 
these two concerns. 
 
257. Hoffman, supra note 169, at 302; Garcia Uhrig, supra note 30, at 1252.  
258. Hoffman, supra note 169, at 302.  
259. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (“Under the exhaustion requirement, a habeas 
petitioner challenging a state conviction must first attempt to present his claim in state court.”). 
260. Hoffman, supra note 169, at 302. 
261. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 784. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
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3. A “Form” of Solution 
In order to provide at least a minimal explanation of why a particular petition 
is denied, California should consider requiring all courts to fill out a standardized 
form whenever they summarily deny habeas petitions. The form would contain a 
list of potential reasons for denial–for example, “untimely” or “procedurally 
defaulted.” The judges would check the boxes next to the applicable reasons. 
Any explanatory comments could be written in the space next to the box. There 
would also be a section where the court could indicate, by checking the 
appropriate box, whether the petition had been denied on procedural grounds, on 
the merits, or both. The superior courts in Riverside County already use this type 
of form. The Riverside County form could serve as a model for the courts of 
appeal and the California Supreme Court.264  
Requiring a standardized form for every summary denial strikes an 
appropriate balance between the need for some kind of explanation and Justice 
Kennedy’s concerns about conserving judicial resources and preserving the case-
law tradition. Because the California Supreme Court and appellate courts 
summarily deny thousands of habeas petitions each year, judicial economy is 
understandably a significant concern. The standardized form represents a middle 
ground solution because it requires scant additional time or effort on the part of 
the judges, yet still provides some insight into why the petition was denied. Since 
the form requires only that the judges check the applicable boxes, the form can 
literally be completed within minutes, if not less. 
Furthermore, the form does not require that the judges engage in additional 
analysis beyond what they would already be doing. As Justice Moreno of the 
California Supreme Court explains, the court performs “the rigorous analysis of 
the facts and of the law” regardless of whether the claim ultimately results in a 
written opinion or a summary denial.265 The only difference is that for written 
opinions, judges must spend more time “converting the in-chambers analysis into 
a written opinion fit for publication.”266 Thus, requiring a court to fill out a form 
after the initial analysis is complete will not necessitate more than a few extra 
minutes of the judges’ time. Of course, should the court wish to spend additional 
time writing comments on the form, it would be within its discretion to do so.267 
 
264. See, e.g., In re Ryan, 2010 WL 6830319 (2010) (using a form to indicate the petitioner’s failure to 
state a prima facie case for habeas relief). 
265. Seligman, supra note 35, at 498. 
266. Id. 
267. See e.g., In re Espinoza-Matthews, 2010 WL 6830323 (2010). In Espinoza-Matthews, a case from 
Riverside County, the superior court checked the box next to “The petition is denied because the petition fails to 
state a prima facie factual case supporting the petitioner’s release.” Next to the box marked “Other,” the court 
added: “Your appeal was denied by California Department of Corrections ‘for excessive verbage.’ Your 
Petition is also full of excessive words. Many arguments are repeated. I still don’t know what happened other 
than you had a bad stomach ache. Your Petition is 60 pages long. If you file another Petition, get to the point 
and be more succinct.” Id.  
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The standardized form would also appease Justice Kennedy’s concern that 
requiring a statement of reasons for every judicial decision would undermine the 
case-law tradition. Under this proposal, the standardized forms would have no 
precedential value. Instead, the reviewing court would simply be required to fill 
out the form and make the contents available both to the petitioner and the 
public, much in the same way unpublished opinions are currently available. Thus, 
the form would not serve as precedent, but would still provide a record at each 
level of court offering at least some insight into why the petition was denied. 
Even this type of minimal record from each court would help the habeas 
petitioner by providing some indication of why the petition is deficient. This will 
give the petitioner an idea of what problems need to be addressed should he 
continue on to federal court. This is especially important since, in order to qualify 
for federal review, the petitioner whose claim was summarily denied bears the 
burden of proving there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny 
relief.268 Although still difficult, this burden becomes slightly more bearable if the 
petitioner at least knows what category of problem each state court relied on in 
denying relief. 
In addition, if California required all of its courts to provide at least a 
minimal explanation of why they chose to deny a petition, it would create a more 
substantial record for federal review. This would conserve judicial resources for 
the system as a whole by reducing the time federal staff attorneys spend 
reviewing petitions filed by state prisoners.269 It would also further the interests of 
federalism by placing the state court’s actual reasoning (versus imputed 
reasoning) at the center of the federal court’s reviewing process.270 Finally, such 
an increase in transparency would provide an important check on California state 




268. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 784. “While it is the state court decision, and not the written opinion, that 
is the object of a federal court’s analysis according to AEDPA’s text 33, a written opinion may provide the best, 
and perhaps only, ground for determining the reasonableness of the decision that it accompanies.” Seligman, 
supra note 35, at 473. 
269. See Hoffman, supra note 169, at 302 (explaining that federal staff attorneys have little to work with 
when initially screening federal habeas petitions because they have only the petition itself and the written record 
of the state court proceedings).  
270. See Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (“Under [AEDPA], a [federal] habeas court must determine what 
arguments or theories supported or. . .could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask 
whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the 
holding in a prior decision of the [U.S. Supreme] Court.”). “Federal habeas review of state convictions 
frustrates . . . the State’s sovereign power.” Id. at 787. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
It is no secret that wrongful convictions occur across the nation; and 
California is not immune from this tragic scenario.271 Even worse than the 
wrongful conviction of an innocent person is that once convicted, an innocent 
person is unlikely to be able to secure his release from prison as a result of 
current habeas corpus law.272 In California, it is not the case that “the truth will set 
you free.” Rather, only evidence that “point[s] unerringly to innocence” will do 
so.273 Yet, this standard is almost impossible to meet.274 
The “lessons [of] the DNA revolution”275 cannot be ignored. Our criminal 
justice system convicts innocent people “with stunning regularity.”276 
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that we will ever be able to completely eliminate 
wrongful convictions.277 Our judicial system will always be at the mercy of 
human error.278 It is precisely because we cannot eliminate the risk of wrongful 
convictions that it becomes crucial to have a contingency plan in place for when 
the system fails.279 Habeas corpus was designed to be that contingency plan.280 As 
one scholar comments, “[w]e know even more today than we did in [the past] 
about the existence of wrongful convictions, yet we continue to fail in our 
societal responsibility to develop a reasonable method for dealing with such 
troubling situations.”281 
California must find a way to provide a full and fair opportunity for 
wrongfully convicted prisoners to end their unjust incarceration. A legal standard 
that requires them to perform an almost impossible feat is simply unfair and fails 
to balance the competing policy objectives of our society. By adopting the new 
trial standard for actual innocence claims based on newly discovered evidence 
and requiring all courts to provide at least a minimal explanation when courts 
 
271. Medwed, supra note 10, at 1442–1443.  
272. Gabel, supra note 153, at 1016 (using California’s newly discovered evidence standard to illustrate 
that “even where [a claim of bare innocence] is cognizable, the standards a prisoner must meet to establish 
entitlement to relief can be quite strict and nearly impossible to meet.”).  
273. In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 766 (1993); In re Hardy, 41 Cal. 4th 977, 1016 (2007). 
274. Gabel, supra note 153, at 1016. 
275. Medwed, supra note 10, at 1470. 
276. Id. 
277. Hoffman, supra note 169, at 301. 
“[N]o matter how much we may try to reform our investigative and trial processes, mistakes will still 
occur. In any system operated by human beings, even perfect procedures cannot completely 
guarantee perfect out-comes. And whether we like it or not, victims, eyewitnesses, police, 




280. Hoffman, supra note 169, at 303 (describing Judge Friendly’s view that “habeas should primarily 
protect against the wrongful conviction of innocent defendants”). 
281. Id. at 305. 
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deny claims, California can take a much-needed step towards rectifying that 




282. See Ridolfi and Possley, supra note 207, at 4 (“This case raises the one issue that is the most feared 
aspect of our system—that an innocent man might be convicted.”). 
